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Abstract
This report evaluates the impact of the EU Emission Trading System (EU ETS) indirect cost compensation on
rms economic performance and competitiveness, seeking to assess potential competition distortions and carbon
leakage risks produced by the policy. The analysis is run on the sample of businesses operating in any of the
sectors eligible to compensation and on the aluminium sector alone. The data employed in the evaluation is at
the rm level and comes from the records on the beneciaries of indirect cost compensation provided by DG
COMP and from the Orbis Bureau Van Dijk database.
Competition distortion is measured in terms of the effects of the intervention on per worker measures of
turnover and value of total assets. The risk of carbon leakage is evaluated on the basis of rm-level indicators
of turnover, value of total assets and number of employees.
The results suggest that receiving compensation for indirect costs does not have a statistically signicant impact
on labour productivity of rms in comparison to those that do not receive funding. Conversely, the evidence
points to a negative effect on performance measured in terms of turnover, value of total assets and employment.
This might be due to a multitude of factors that affect rms' economic performance, for instance differences in
energy costs across countries that do not provide compensation compared to MS that foresee this type of aid.
As far as the analysis on aid intensity is concerned, which only contemplates a more homogeneous pool
of rms operating in aiding countries, higher compensation amounts do not seem to generate competition
distortion. At the same time, a higher level of subsidies appears to marginally reduce the risk of carbon leakage,
as performance measured in terms of turnover, value of total assets and number of employees improves.
Estimated coefcients suggest that, for each 1% increase in the amount of the subsidy received (i.e. around
1,000 EUR), rms expand their turnover and their assets value by 0.01%, and their workforce by 0.07%.
The report also provides some suggestions on future data collection and reporting provisions, aimed at reducing
cost, facilitating data management and increasing the quality and level of accuracy of future evaluations.
1
1 Introduction
The European Commission has set to achieve by 2050 ambitious environmental goals through a package of
measures, known as the European Green Deal, ranging from cutting-edge Research & Innovation to environ-
mental policies, including a severe emissions cut (European Commission (COM(2019) 640 nal)). The aim is to
put the EU on a path of more sustainable growth, thereby improving citizens' health conditions and well-being
and limiting environment-related risks.
EU actions in preserving environmental quality are not recent. One of the primary tools of the EU policy to
contrast climate change and reduce Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions is the EU Emission Trading System (EU
ETS), approved in 2003. The ETS operates so as to create a carbon price signal that induces rms and businesses
to reduce their emission in two ways. On the one hand, businesses must buy CO2 certicates equivalent to their
industrial emissions (direct costs). On the other hand, rms incur in an additional cost for the electricity they
consume (indirect costs) because also their energy suppliers (power generators) are subject to direct costs.
The EU foresees compensation for both types of costs, with the primary aim of avoiding that CO2 intensive
industriesmove their businesses outside the EU. This phenomenon, which is commonly known as carbon leakage
is detrimental for two reasons. First, rms moving to countries that have less stringent regulation on emissions
would continue to contribute to high levels of worldwide emissions. Second, their relocation could translate
into closing or downsizing of businesses operating in the EU, with a subsequent loss of jobs. Furthermore,
carbon leakage in the medium-long term might discourage rms' investment in new production facilities or
reinvestment in those that are at the end of their lifetime (Matthes, 2008a). In contrast, overcompensation
might determine market distortions by subsidizing the activities of rms which could otherwise be not protable
(Matthes, 2008b).
The EU mandates compensation of direct costs via the granting of free allowances by Member States
(MS) directly under the ETS Directive (European Commission (2003/87/EC)). Similarly, indirect costs can be
compensated by Member States under approved State Aid measures and in compliance with the corresponding
Guidelines (European Commission (2012/C 158/04)). Compensation of indirect costs, however, is optional for
MS and, as such, it might give rise to distortions within the internal market.
This study originates from a number of exchanges between the JRC and DG COMP in relation to the foreseen
revision of the Guidelines on State Aid measures in the context of the GHG allowance trading system.1 Its aim
consists in evaluating the effects of indirect costs compensation in terms of competition distortion and risk of
carbon leakage on rms.
The assessment of carbon leakage risk is not straightforward, as leakage might arise from different channels
and could be affected by a number of factors (carbon price level and its worldwide evolution, policy responses,
market characteristics and other rm level factors). Nevertheless, understanding rms response to the EU ETS
could help designing more effective policy interventions. Ideally, plant level data could provide a more detailed
picture of rms' productive choices due to direct and indirect costs and to their compensation; unfortunately,
data at this level of granularity is rarely available and often hard to match with other rm-level information.
A sizable part of the existing economic literature has focused on the direct effect of the EU ETS on emissions
abatement, that is considered the main goal of the regulation. Notwithstanding, there is a large number of
studies looking at rms' economic performance, measured mainly by prots, revenues, output and employment.
A detailed review of the studies on the rst ten years of the ETS guidelines is illustrated by Martin et al. (2016),
which focuses especially on contributions seeking to establish a causal link and providing quantitative evidence.
In response to the ETS regulation, rms could resort to costly abatement or buy permits. In both cases this might
generate lower prots and market share loss, especially for businesses competing in international markets and
unable to pass-through the higher carbon cost (Martin et al., 2016).
This evaluation study adds to the body of literature analysing the impact of the EU ETS on rms economic
performance and competitiveness. In line with other papers (Abrell et al., 2011; Anger and Oberndorfer, 2008), it
gathers rm-level data from the Orbis database but providing fresh evidence both for the period under analysis
and for its main goals. Indeed, the vast majority of the literature looks at the impact of the direct ETS cost and
only a few papers cover the period after 2013, while none of them exploits the subsidy intensity.
The aim of the analysis is to assess whether the indirect cost compensation under State Aid measures
in the period 20132017 has had an impact on the internal market, using rm-level data. In particular, this
study evaluates the impact of the aid on rms' economic outcomes and the potential existence of competition
distortions. The latter is assessed by resorting to per employee measures in terms of either turnover or value of
total assets. Furthermore, it investigates on changes in operating revenues (turnover) and number of employees
to assess the impacts on carbon leakage risk in the short run. The analysis is complemented by looking at the
impact on the value of the rms' total assets, which might be representative of the investment decisions and
therefore signal the existence of leakage in the medium-long term in so far as higher carbon costs bring about
1 The interactions between the JRC and DG COMP commenced from the participation to an upstream meeting with the Regulatory
Scrutiny Board (RSB) in April 2019, where the revision of the Guidelines was discussed.
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closure of the undertakings or redirect new investments in non-regulated areas.
The evaluation exercise presented in this report exploits the information in the records on the beneciaries of
indirect cost compensation that were provided to DG COMP by the MS with an approved State Aid under the EU
ETS framework. The data was then linked to the Orbis Bureau Van Dijk database, which contains balance sheet
information of rms. The analysis covers the period 20092017 and comprises rms operating across different
sectors in 12 MS, 6 of which provide funding for indirect cost compensation. The data allows to compare the
average change in performance for a group of rms receiving compensation with the one of a similar group of
rms that operate in the absence of aid, following a Difference-in-differences (DiD) approach. The evaluation
looks at rms operating in all eligible sectors, as well as on the subgroup from the aluminium sector.
Although in the empirical literature there is widespread consensus in recognising the effectiveness of the
ETS provisions in terms of emissions abatement, ndings on rms' economic performance are not unambiguous,
suggesting that the desired effects on emission and innovation are costly in terms of economic performance,
but still not conrming the existence of a marked detrimental effect (Martin et al., 2016).
The results of the analysis illustrated in this report suggest that the indirect cost compensation supplied
by MS with an approved State Aid scheme had little or negligible impact on the measures of competitiveness
considered, namely turnover per worker and value of total assets per employee. However, when outcomes are
considered in absolute terms (i.e. turnover, total assets and number of employees), beneciaries seem to perform
worse than non-aided rms. These ndings are partially in line with some existing works that investigate on
the effects of energy-related interventions (energy tax) in Finland (Laukkanen et al., 2019) and in the United
Kingdom (Martin et al., 2014). The former nd a negative effect on revenues and gross output, the latter observes
evidence pointing to the absence of an effect of the energy tax on productivity, production and employment.
When considering studies on the ETS interventions, a negative impact on employment is conrmed also in
Abrell et al. (2011) and Wagner et al. (2013), the latter using plant-level data in France. In contrast, a positive
link on value added and labour productivity at plant level is found by Klemetsen et al. (2020) in Norway. A
positive effect on turnover is identied by Chan et al. (2013). Other studies using rm-level data also found
a non-statistically signicant effect on turnover (Abrell et al., 2011), employment (Flues and Lutz, 2015), total
factor productivity and investment (Commins et al., 2011). The heterogeneity characterising the empirical
evidence on rms' economic performance might be grounded in several aspects, ranging from data granularity,
timeline of the analysis and the identication of treated and control groups. It is also important to highlight that
it is difcult to quantify indirect ETS costs for rms as they depend on pass-trough electricity costs and on the
features of the industrial sectors. Moreover, electricity prices are sometimes the results of bilateral negotiations
and might consistently differ between rms and be subject to diversied levels of tax and levies in each MS.
Results from the analysis on the intensive margins point out that rms receiving a higher subsidy tend to
experience a better performance in terms of turnover, investments and job retention in comparison to rms
receiving subsidy of lower amounts. Here, the focus is only on the beneciaries of indirect compensation for
which it was possible to retrieve aid intensity data, thus implying a more homogeneous sample of rms that
have comparable characteristics in all, but for the treatment intensity.
Finally, this report provides some recommendations on the potential improvement in relation to reporting
obligations and data collection, striving to ease data handling and increase the quality and accurateness of
future evaluation exercises.
The remainder of the report is organised as follows. The next section provides a brief overview of the
institutional context and a description of the EU ETS. Section 3 illustrates the data used in the analysis: the
two data sources (the records on the beneciaries provided by the MS and the Orbis database), the matching
procedure applied to link the information at the rm level and a set of descriptive statistics that characterize the
nal sample. Section 4 outlines the methodology used to evaluate the effects of the indirect cost compensation
on rm nancial outcomes and section 5 presents the results. Section 6 contains critical remarks and provides
a list of suggestions for future improvements. Finally, section 7 concludes.
3
2 Institutional Setting
The EU ETS is the largest trading system of emission allowances worldwide (Bocklet et al., 2019). It is in place
since 2005 as a tool to meet the goals of the Kyoto Protocol (UN Convention for Climate Change, 1997).
The ETS is based on a cap and trade mechanism, which sets a threshold for the total GHG emission volumes
produced by energy-intensive installations and aircraft operators and allows trading those limited allowances.
The emission allowances are rights to produce GHG emissions (measured as tonnes of CO2 equivalent). The
cap is xed in terms of number of allowances available in the whole system and it has been subject to yearly
reductions from 2013 to 2020.
Participants to the ETS receive a certain number of emission rights for free and can exchange the allowances
in an auction-based market. The installations that do not have sufcient allowances to cover their GHG emissions
are subject to signicant penalties. The limited supply of allowances in the market gives them value and fosters
an efcient allocations of the emission rights where there is either a higher demand or a lower capacity to switch
towards less pollutant productive system. Analogously, this system encourages companies to adopt solutions
which cut GHG emissions to meet the ETS target, thus allowing to efciently fulll environmental goals.
The ETS directive was formally adopted in 2003 (European Commission (2003/87/EC)) but several changes
have been applied over time, identifying four trading periods, or phases. The rst pilot phase covered the
period 20052007, which tested the functioning of the carbon market and prepared Member States for the rst
commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, that started in 2008. The second phase (20082012) reduced the
number of allowances by 6.5% to trigger a more effective emissions reduction by increasing allowances price,
which fell to zero at the end of the previous period. In the third phase (20132020) a major reform took place,
introducing an EU-wide cap on emissions with a reduction of the free allowances of about 1.74% by year and
the replacement of the cost-free allocation with the auctioning of the allowances. The fourth trading period is
expected to run from 2021 to 2030. To date, the EU ETS covers about 11,000 power stations and plants in the
EU 28 plus Iceland, Norway and Liechtenstein and the aviation sector since 2012.
An important potential drawback of the EU ETS system is the risk that EU companies affected by the climate
policy restrictions are in a competitive disadvantage with respect to companies operating outside of the EU,
which are not subject to the policy. In fact, the EU ETS actually generates two categories of additional costs due
to the emissions restrictions for the rms targeted by the policy: direct and indirect costs. The direct emission
costs are those associated with a rm own emissions and the need to purchase CO2 certicates; conversely,
indirect costs are generated by the rm suppliers and transferred throughout other direct costs, i.e. the electricity
prices. Indeed, power generator providers have to use allowances to cover their emissions and they could repay
the higher production costs by increasing the electricity prices of their customers. Therefore, businesses might
decide to relocate their production in countries with less strict provisions in terms of GHG emissions cut, thus
generating a global increase of GHG emissions. To address this risk, which is known as carbon leakage, the EU
ETS foresees direct and indirect cost compensation.
To this end, the Directive identies the sectors which are exposed to a signicant risk of carbon leakage
(European Commission (2012/C 158/04), Annex II) and establishes some mitigating measures for the higher
costs of electricity due to ETS. In terms of direct emission costs, sectors exposed to carbon leakage are exempted
from the phasing out of the free allocation of emission allowances. In relation to the indirect emission costs,
the EU ETS allows MS to provide by State Aid a nancial aid to electricity-intensive undertakings. The value of
the compensations, as well as the sectors eligible and the denition of electricity-intensive are specied in the
State Aid decision of the MS, as long as it complies with the EU ETS Guidelines (European Commission (2012/C
158/04)). The carbon leakage list of sectors is updated every ve years and sectors remain in the list until
renewal.
Table 1: State Aid decisions on EU ETS indirect compensation
Member State Duration of the scheme Budget of the scheme Commission decision
Belgium (Flanders) 2013 - 2020 EUR 7-113 mln† SA.37017
Belgium (Wallonia) 2017 - 2020 EUR 17,5 mln (2017-2020) SA.49630
Finland 2016 - 2020 EUR 149 mln (2016-2020) SA.44378
France 2015 - 2020 EUR 364 mln (2015-2018) SA.43389 / SA.49875
Germany 2013 - 2020 EUR 576 mln (2013-2015) SA.36103
Greece 2013 - 2020 EUR 14-20 mln† SA.38630
Lithuania 2014 - 2020 EUR 13,1 mln (2014-2020) SA.41981
Luxembourg 2017 - 2020 EUR 48-60 mln (2017-2020) SA.51097
Slovakia 2014 - 2020 EUR 250 mln (2014-2020) SA.43506
Spain 2013 - 2020 EUR 695 mln (2013-2020)
SA.36650 / SA.45164 /
SA.49751 / SA.53427
The Netherlands 2013 - 2020 EUR 156 mln (2014-2015) SA.37084
United Kingdom 2013 - 2020 GBP 113 mln (2013-2015) SA.35543
Note: † annual budget based on CO2 price. Poland recently had a State Aid approved for the period 2019-2020 (SA.53850).
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The compensation for indirect costs is applied on a voluntary basis by each MS following a standard State
Aid procedure (Table 1). Over the 28 EU Members, only 11 decided to introduce compensation for indirect
costs (Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Slovakia, Spain and
the United Kingdom). This exposes rms operating in the same sector to a different cost of the regulation
according to the country's decision to compensate or not, thereby creating an interesting scenario to set a
quasi-experimental framework for the evaluation of this provision of the EU ETS. The aid is delivered as a direct
grant, with the exception of Spain which has foreseen also an interest rate subsidy and a tax rate deduction.
5
3 Data
This section describes in detail the data used in the analysis, which come from two main sources: the records on
the beneciaries of the ETS indirect cost compensation granted under State Aid measures and the information
on balance sheets of rms. The former were provided by MS to DG COMP, the latter is contained in the Orbis
Bureau Van Dijk database. Then, the procedure that was used to match the data from the two sources is
outlined. Finally, the resulting sample is thoroughly described.
3.1 Data on beneficiaries of ETS indirect cost compensation
To date, eleven MS have applied State Aid measures for the compensation of the EU ETS indirect costs. Overall,
the JRC received records of beneciaries on six MS: Belgium, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, the
United Kingdom.2
The records on the beneciaries of the compensation for indirect EU ETS costs were provided by DG COMP to
the JRC in their original format, as they were transmitted from each MS to DG COMP. The format in which these
records are presented varies across MS and years. Thus, putting together these records required a considerable
harmonisation exercise.
Data on Belgium is differentiated by region. In fact, there exist two State Aid cases for Belgium: one for
Flanders (SA.37017) which started in 2013 and one for Wallonia (SA.49630) which started in 2017. In the rst
case, rm-level records cover the years 20132016. Here, the available information includes the name of the
rm, the NACE in which the rm operates, the reference year, the year of payment and the amount subsidised
in EUR. In the second case, a list of names and their associated identier used by the public administration of
Wallonia was provided, along with the corresponding NACE, the compensation foreseen under the guidelines and
the one that was actually paid after some adjustments and weighting. The records for Wallonia refer to the
year 2017 only.
The records transmitted by Germany (SA.36103) cover the years 20132016. Data are at activity/plant
level and include a unique rm and plant identier which does not change over time, the name of the rm
and of the plant/activity, the corresponding NACE, and the necessary information to compute the amount of
compensation that each rm receives (correction factor, yearly and benchmark consumption and production,
whether it refers to a primary or a fall back calculation). In fact, the German records do not provide the amount
of compensation explicitly. Thus, the JRC retrieved all the missing information from ofcial documentation
and applied the formula to compute the compensation as from the Guidelines (European Commission (2012/C
158/04)).3
Data from Spain (SA.36650) is at plant level and covers the year 2016 only, despite the Aid scheme being
in place since 2013.4 The available data is quite detailed and includes names of the rms and of the single
installations, information on the sector of activity (NACE and PRODCOM), yearly baseline output and baseline
electricity benchmark and the amount of the aid received (including adjustments applied to the aid amounts,
the total requested grant amount and the total amount actually paid). Differently from other MS, Spain also
provides details on the VAT number of rms, which constitutes an important piece of information when linking
different databases.
Records from Finland (SA.44378) cover 2016 only, that is the rst year of the compensation scheme. Data
are at plant level and include the name of the rm and of the aided installations, the NACE in which they operate,
information on electricity consumption and production and the amount of the aid received.
Records from the Netherlands (SA.37084) cover the years 20142017, although the scheme was rst
implemented in 2013. Data are at activity level and include the name of the rms, the NACE in which they
operate, information on primary and fall back electricity consumption and production and the amount of the
aid received (including adjustments applied to the aid amounts, the total requested grant amount and the total
amount actually paid).
Finally, records from UK (SA.35543) are available for the years 20132016. The records referred to 2013 are
very detailed and include activity-level information on NACE, 8-digit PRODCOM, benchmark and yearly production
and consumption and the aid paid out in 2013. Records referred to the following years only contain the name of
the business, the name of the installation, 8-digit PRODCOM information and the aid amounts obtained under
ETS and CPS.5
Given the differences existing in the records, the harmonisation exercise considered only the pieces of
information that were available for all beneciaries from all MS: name of rm, 4-digit NACE and aid amount.
2 Records for France, Greece, Luxembourg and Slovakia were not available. Lithuania also has an approved State Aid but it is not
considered because only one beneciary has been compensated over the years.
3 A check was made in collaboration with DG COMP to ensure the formula was computed correctly.
4 Records referred to SA.45164, SA.49751 and SA.53427 were not provided.
5 The Carbon Price Support (CPS) was introduced by the UK government in addition to the European scheme.
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This is briey summarised in Table 2.6
At the end of the harmonisation process, a total of 753 unique records, divided across the six countries
mentioned, were gathered. Figure 1 reports the number of rms that were identied by country and year across
all sectors (left) and in the aluminium sector alone (right). Germany is the country with the largest group of
Table 2: Descriptive statistics on beneficiaries
Information BE (F) BE (W) FI DE NL ES UK All MS
Name of rm Y Y Y Y Y Y Y X
Name of installation/plant Y Y Y Y Y
Time-invariant record id Y
VAT number Y
4-digit NACE Y Y Y Y Y Y P X
8-digit PRODCOM Y Y
Elements to compute formula P Y Y Y Y P
Aid computed/requested Y Y Y
Adjustments to aid Y Y
Aid paid out Y Y Y C Y Y Y X
Other non-ETS aid compensated P
Missing years 2017 2017 2017 2013 2013, 2014, 2017
2015, 2017
Note: BE(F) and BE(W) refer to Flanders and Wallonia, respectively; Y = available in all records; P = partially available (only in some records); C = computed
by the JRC. Elements to compute formula include baseline/benchmark and yearly consumption and production.
Figure 1: Number of beneficiaries in the original records
Table 3: Descriptive statistics on aid paid to beneficiaries
Country Year N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
BE 2013 75 657.342 1313.425 5.261 6850.670
2014 77 389.103 748.620 2.316 4097.465
2015 77 511.476 985.072 1.132 5383.989
2016 78 599.364 1156.559 1.150 6352.736
2017 30 250.000 325.074 6.097 1170.421
DE 2013 324 1009.256 2580.008 6.845 25745.660
2014 320 605.364 1582.049 5.746 15175.500
2015 319 996.288 2613.815 0.000 25290.570
2016 313 677.319 1736.169 7.020 16491.550
FI 2016 35 1083.028 1971.585 19.850 11204.670
ES 2016 101 59.279 118.824 0.483 823.666
NL 2014 68 786.110 1763.323 0.000 8735.586
2015 66 474.730 1030.872 6.058 5155.428
2016 73 732.559 1586.668 9.503 8086.945
2017 76 485.566 1082.863 6.579 5598.655
UK 2013 52 609.754 1419.539 8.627 8888.148
2014 54 362.304 872.818 0.000 5564.604
2015 54 394.771 795.618 18.857 4031.508
2016 57 295.580 579.005 5.068 3141.160
Total 2013 451 904.671 2306.084 5.261 25745.660
2014 519 571.671 1456.005 0.000 15175.500
2015 516 794.282 2151.311 0.000 25290.570
2016 657 567.685 1472.570 0.483 16491.550
2017 106 418.896 937.080 6.097 5598.655
Note: Aid is expressed in thousands of EUR. BE 2013-3016 refers to Flanders only; BE 2017 refers
to Wallonia only.
6 Section 6 highlights difculties and limitations that these differences have caused for the execution of this evaluation. Thus, a list of
suggestions aiming at facilitating future evaluation exercises is provided.
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funded rms (320 per year circa), while the number of aided entities in the other countries is relatively balanced,
at around 50-70 businesses per year. This pattern is resembled when focusing only on the aluminium sector,
as the plot to the right shows. The only exception is found in Finland, where there are no rms operating in this
sector.
Details on the number of rms identied and statistics on the aid amounts paid to them are shown in Table 3,
by country and year. Finland and Germany pay relatively higher amounts, on average, while Spain is the country
with smaller subsidies per rm.
3.2 Financial data on firms
Firms nancials are extracted from the Orbis Bureau Van Dijk database, which provides balance sheet information
at rm level. The panel is constructed following the methodology proposed by Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2015) and
all values are harmonised according to the Eurostat Consumer Price Index (HCPI).
The dataset includes all rms operating in one of the sectors covered by the EU ETS and listed in Table A.2.
Sectors are identied using NACE Rev.2 codes at 4 digits (core, primary and secondary activities are considered).
Companies registered with consolidated accounts when there is also an unconsolidated record and rms with
no nancial information are excluded.
For the purpose of the analysis, the Orbis database is mainly used to gather variables representing rms'
performance. However, the data suffer from a number of issues, especially related to the presence of many
missing values due to heterogeneous reporting obligations across countries. To avoid a consistent data loss
determined by missing nancials, the choice of the variables has been based also on their completeness.
Firms regulated by the ETS might indirectly pay the emissions reduction with lower prots due to costly
abatement or permits purchase. Moreover, competition with rivals companies not affected by the ETS could
yield to lower market share. All these elements might discourage rms' new investments or even facilitate their
relocation in non-treated areas. Balance sheet data included in the Orbis dataset allows assessing the potential
competition distortion and carbon leakage risk at the rm level, by considering some standard indicators of
economic performance.7
In particular, the effect on competitiveness is assessed by looking at per employee measures, namely: labour
productivity (turnover/employees) and assets per employee (total assets/employees). Both indicators offer a
relative measure of rm performance, in terms of output value (turnover) or investments (total assets) scaled
over rms size (number of employees).
In order to provide a more complete picture of the effects that might occur in the short term, the analysis
considers also changes in operating revenues (turnover) and number of employees which should mirror produc-
tion choices directly. Turnover is a standard indicator of rm performance expressed as the value of the services
and goods sold. It is widely considered as one of the main factors to assess the economic growth of a company,
i.e. rm's protability. Furthermore, while a pure measure of prot might suffer from potential prot shifting
practices, turnover is unlikely to be affected by these operations. The number of employees accounts for rm
size and helps identifying the potential risk of carbon leakage in terms of jobs loss. In the same vein, changes
in the investment decisions, which are likely to happen in the medium-long term, are here proxied by the value
of total assets that allows detecting expansions or shrinkages of the rms' assets endowments.
3.3 Matching data
Once the records on beneciaries were harmonised and the data extracted from Orbis were appropriately
cleaned, the two databases were matched. Given the poor quality of the data at hand, the matching procedure
proved to be quite demanding and required a substantial amount of manual recoding.
To start with, rms registered in Spain were matched on the basis of the VAT number, which was available
in the original les on beneciaries transmitted by the Spanish authorities. This eased up substantially the
matching of these rms. Unfortunately, information on the VAT number was only accessible on the Spanish
records. In all other cases, a probabilistic matching on company names by country was carried out. This consists
in an algorithm that assigns a score to each entry on the basis of how well it matches to any of the records
existing in the data. The score goes from zero (no match) to one (perfect match) and considers the position of
each letter in a given name. In total, 398 exact matches were found between the entries in Orbis and those in
the beneciaries records. The remaining ones were checked manually one-by-one. Eventually, 603 beneciaries
were correctly matched to the Orbis database, i.e. 80% of the original pool of beneciaries. The entries from
the records on the beneciaries that were discarded either have missing nancial information or do not appear
at all in the Orbis database.
Orbis reports three different variables that refer to the activity of each rm: a NACE code referred to the core
activity, a NACE code for the primary activity and a NACE code associated to the secondary activity. Sometimes
7 For a survey of other studies using this type of data see Martin et al. (2016).
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these are all equal to each other, but in most cases different codes are reported. In some instances, the NACE
code that appears in the records of the beneciaries does not coincide with the core activity as stored in the
Orbis database. For rms that are funded under the ETS indirect cost compensation measures, the NACE code is
the one reported in the original records of the beneciaries. For those that are not funded, priority is given to the
NACE code associated to the core activity carried out by the rm, if this appears in the list of activities eligible
for the ETS indirect cost compensation (Table A.2). If this is not the case, the NACE code that is considered is the
one associated to the primary activity, as long as this appears in the list of eligible activities. Any rm that does
not satisfy this criteria is dropped from the sample. Therefore, all entities that report an eligible NACE code as
secondary activity only are not considered.
Moreover, the Orbis database contains information on rms that do operate in the eligible activities in the
countries that have adopted indirect cost compensation schemes but do not appear in the original records
transmitted by MS to DG COMP. The reason might lie in the existence of the de minimis rule, which provides
that subsidies of less than 200,000 EUR granted to an undertaking over a period of 3 years do not constitute
State Aid within the meaning of the EC Treaty's ban on aid liable to distort competition (European Commission
(Regulation (EU) No 1407/2013)). Thus, it might be that the records provided by MS to DG COMP do not account
for these funds and therefore rms do not appear as beneciaries, whilst, de facto, receiving some funding. As
it is impossible to determine whether rms in the Orbis database belong to such group, all entities operating in
an eligible sector of activity in a country with an approved State Aid measure for ETS indirect cost compensation
are excluded from the nal sample if they do not appear in the beneciary list.
A quick visual inspection of the data revealed an over-representation of larger rms among the group of the
beneciaries. In fact, the average turnover of those rms belonging to the group of the non-beneciaries was
sensibly lower than the turnover of the beneciaries. This might be explained by the exclusion from the sample
of those rms that appear as non-funded while being potential beneciaries in the six aiding countries just
described above. Figure 2 shows the distribution of the turnover across the two groups. The thick curve, which
refers to the group of the beneciaries, lays much further to the right (i.e. towards higher values) in comparison
to the thin curve, which represents the group of the non-beneciaries. Thus, in order to ensure comparability
between the two samples and retain only rms that have similar size and economic potential, the sample was
trimmed at a threshold that corresponds to the value of the rst percentile of the distribution of the beneciaries
(i.e. the vertical dashed line in the gure). This implies that rms with a turnover lower than 16,762 EUR, namely
15 beneciaries and 11,554 non-funded rms, were excluded from the nal sample.
Finally, the sample was further rened by removing businesses that do not appear in the Orbis database
continuously over the period 20132017. This procedure was implemented in order to avoid potential distortions
that may arise because some rms disappear from the sample and it is not possible to determine whether this
Figure 2: Sample selection on turnover
Note: The gure shows the distribution of ln(turnover) for non-beneciaries and for beneciaries (thin
and thick lines, respectively). The vertical dashed line refers to the 1st percentile of the distribution
for beneciaries. This corresponds to 12.029 in logarithmic form, which is equivalent to the actual
value of 16,762 EUR.
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occurs because they exit from the market or if this is due to reporting issues. In the rst case, in fact, a selection
bias may arise, as only the most virtuous businesses would survive. Thus, only rms that appear continuously
in the years 20132017 are retained.8
3.4 Descriptive statistics
The nal sample consists of an unbalanced panel of 3,706 rms, of which 319 are funded under State Aid
measures for ETS indirect cost compensation. The sample covers the period 20092017, for a total of 27,290
observations.
All rms in the sample operate activities in one of the 13 4-digit NACE-coded sectors or 7 subsectors that
are eligible for indirect cost compensation, either in a country with an approved State Aid scheme or in a country
that does not provide funding. These rms however may have several activities, which explains why they are
reported under 26 NACE-code, the main NACE-code reecting their principal activity. These are listed in Table A.2.
Throughout the report, all analyses are run both on the total sample which includes all 26 sectors and on a
smaller sub-sample of rms operating in the aluminium sector (NACE 24.42) alone.
Figure 3 shows the total number of rms in the sample, by country and by year (left) and by sector of activity
(right). The plots at the top refer to the beneciaries of indirect cost compensation, those at the bottom to the
comparison group (non-funded rms).
The sample of the beneciaries amounts to around 300 rms per year, while non-funded rms are about
2,500 every year. The two samples are not homogeneous in the type of activity carried out. In fact, funded rms
are quite represented in many sectors, with the manufacture of paper and paperboard (NACE 17.12) being the
largest group. In the case of rms that operate in countries that do not provide ETS indirect cost compensation,
45% of them belong to NACE 46.75 (Wholesale of chemical products).9
Figure 5 shows the distribution of the rm performance indicators in the nal sample. The information
provided by the two plots at the top clearly shows a difference in size, measured both as the value of the total
assets and the number of employees, between beneciaries and non-beneciaries. However, when the two
Figure 3: Number of funded and non-funded firms, all sectors
8 See Table A.1 for a summary of the rms that are dropped from the sample with this procedure.
9 These differences are accounted for in the estimation of the effects of the indirect compensation on rm outcomes with the use of
NACE xed effects (see section 4 for details). The robustness of the results is also tested by excluding each sector at a time from the
sample (section 5).
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics on aid paid to beneficiaries, final sample
Country Year All sectors Aluminium
N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
BE 2013 38 94.882 161.160 1.068 677.531 3 37.188 50.716 7.864 95.750
2014 37 58.171 92.902 0.633 407.206 3 22.818 31.692 4.253 59.412
2015 38 74.782 121.908 0.840 538.399 3 29.903 41.407 5.760 77.716
2016 41 84.219 141.873 1.017 646.518 4 27.168 44.036 2.904 93.149
2017 24 30.556 36.164 0.634 121.759
DE 2013 114 143.997 283.932 1.191 1819.966 10 148.563 340.967 1.191 1095.468
2014 114 87.437 179.535 0.723 1116.502 9 110.203 254.205 0.723 777.062
2015 113 144.367 298.268 2.150 1857.033 10 166.539 405.932 2.748 1303.060
2016 114 96.449 198.022 1.492 1225.922 10 111.895 270.811 1.798 870.791
ES 2016 62 6.513 13.895 0.160 82.087 2 45.366 51.931 8.644 82.087
FI 2016 25 138.517 226.953 3.720 1124.837
NL 2014 11 93.704 149.647 2.782 487.243 2 4.227 2.043 2.782 5.671
2015 13 48.238 82.796 1.646 289.021 2 2.500 1.208 1.646 3.354
2016 12 80.391 134.969 2.584 453.865 2 3.926 1.897 2.584 5.267
2017 14 49.362 88.865 1.812 318.263 2 2.753 1.330 1.812 3.693
UK 2013 28 62.634 165.008 2.245 875.483 4 10.278 12.566 2.245 28.833
2014 30 36.042 101.617 0.683 556.460 4 8.344 10.509 1.408 23.983
2015 33 30.713 69.055 1.886 379.705 4 10.223 10.276 1.886 24.866
2016 33 23.837 48.770 0.510 261.070 3 4.063 2.876 1.479 7.162
Total 2013 180 120.972 247.755 1.068 1819.966 17 96.371 264.497 1.191 1095.468
2014 192 74.126 154.408 0.633 1116.502 18 61.228 181.983 0.723 777.062
2015 197 105.563 238.858 0.840 1857.033 19 94.789 297.819 1.646 1303.060
2016 287 69.917 159.627 0.160 1225.922 21 63.733 189.161 1.479 870.791
2017 38 37.484 60.598 0.634 318.263 2 2.753 1.330 1.812 3.693
Note: Aid is expressed in thousands of EUR. BE 2013-3016 refers to Flanders only; BE 2017 refers to Wallonia only.
proxies for labour productivity are considered (namely, turnover per employee and total assets per employee),
this difference fades, as the two distribution are almost overlapping. In other words, while the two samples
appear to be systematically different in terms of size and capacity, when performance is standardized on the
basis of the workforce employed, beneciaries and non-beneciaries appear to be relatively similar to each
other.
Figure 4 displays the distribution of the subsidies received by the funded rms by country and year (left plot)
and by sector (right plot).10 The distribution of the subsidies appears to be relatively similar from one country
to the other (with the exception of Spain, which lies in a lower position with respect to the others) but very
heterogeneous across sectors. Table 4 reports the main descriptive statistics of the amounts by country and
year. Germany and Finland are the most generous countries with aid amounts above 100,000 EUR on average,
while Spain grants the smallest amounts (6,573 EUR on average).
The aluminium sector accounts for almost 8% of the sample of the beneciaries. It is covered by around
5% of non-funded rms. This sector is represented in all MS considered, except Finland, proportionally to the
total number of rms operating in each country (Figure 6). As previously shown in Figure 4 with reference to all
types of activities, the distribution of subsidy amounts over time is fairly homogeneous also in the case of the
aluminium sector (Figure 7).
Figure 4: Granted subsidy, all sectors
10 Boxplots convey the following information: boxes range from the rst (25%) to the third (75%) quartile of the distribution, with a line
in the center of the box which ags the median value; whiskers show the largest value between the minimum and the maximum of the
distributions, or 1.5 times the interquartile range; in the latter case, outliers are also marked with a circle.
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Figure 5: Distribution of performance indicators by group
Figure 6: Number of funded and non-funded firms, aluminium sector
Figure 7: Granted subsidy, aluminium sector
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4 Methodology
The aim of the analysis is to assess whether the EU ETS compensation for indirect costs has contributed to
reducing the risk of carbon leakage for rms operating in the exposed sectors, whilst not generating competition
distortions within the internal market.
The intervention concerns rms operating in selected sectors in a given group of countries. The treated
group is composed of rms operating in eligible sectors in aided countries: Belgium, Germany, Spain, Finland,
the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. For most MS the treatment starts in 2013, while in Finland it starts
in 2016 and in Belgium-Wallonia in 2017.
The control group is dened on the basis of the rms that operate in the same sectors as those in the
treatment group but in countries that do not provide indirect cost compensation. These are: Bulgaria, Czech
Republic, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Romania and Sweden. However, Bulgaria and
Romania entered the EU only in 2007, hence, rms in these countries might be on a different growth path
compared to those operating in other MS. Moreover, Ireland, Latvia and Malta have a very small sample size
and hence they are not considered. The nal sample of rms in the control group comprises the following six
MS: Czech Republic, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Portugal and Sweden.
Data is available for a period that spans from before to after the start of the compensation, i.e. from 2009
to 2017.
A simple comparison between the performance of rms receiving the intervention and those not receiving
it after the inception of the indirect cost compensation would not appropriately capture its effects because it
would not account for differences in the pre-intervention period. These might, for instance, arise from the fact
that some sectors were already subject to the direct cost compensation under Phase I (20052007) and Phase
II (20082012) of the ETS.
Thus, a Difference-in-Differences model can account for these aspects. It consists in taking the difference
of the outcome before and after the treatment for rms in the control group and subtracting it from the
same difference observed among rms in the treated group. This allows accounting for unobserved differences
between the two groups which are xed over time as well as differences that vary through time but affect both
control and treatment groups equally (such as economy-wide factors).
The estimation of the effects is based on the following regression framework:
Yisct = βTsct + γi + δt + σXct + θst + isct (1)
where Yisct is the outcome for rm i, operating in sector s in country c in year t. In the analysis, ve
rm outcomes are considered: turnover per employee, total assets per employee, turnover, total assets and
the number of employees. These are all expressed in logarithm to ease the interpretation of the results, as
explained below.
The effect of the EU ETS indirect cost compensation is captured by the coefcient β, which is the one
associated to Tsct.
The variable Tsct takes two forms. In one case, it is an indicator that takes value one if the rm is deemed
to receive indirect cost compensation, because it operates in a country where the sector is eligible to funding in
that year, and value zero otherwise (i.e. either it operates in an aiding country in a period prior to the enactment
of the State Aid scheme or it operates in a country were indirect cost compensation is not contemplated). Here,
the indicator is referred to as `Aid' and is used in the analysis described in section 5.1. The estimation of the
coefcient β associated to this indicator allows answering to the following question: by what percentage does
the rm's performance change when it receives compensation, regardless of the amount of the aid?
In the second case, which applies to the results presented in section 5.2, Tsct is (the logarithm of) the
amount of the subsidy received by each rm and is named `Subsidy'. Here, the β expresses an elasticity, thus it
addresses the question: by what percentage does the rm's performance change for every one per cent increase
in the amount of the aid?11
In addition, the model allows for a number of xed effects, which are meant to capture time-invariant
differences that might exist across rms (γi) and years (δt), or shocks that might occur in specic time periods
in given sectors (θst).
Adding these sets of xed effects in the model is vital to eliminate or attenuate any potential confounding
factor that might arise, especially given the lack of observable characteristics to use as controls. The inclusion of
rm xed effects (γi) clears the estimation of β from all rm-specic factors that are not observable and do not
(or are unlikely to) change over time. This is the case, for instance, of rm size or market power of the group. The
year xed effects (δt) pick up the potential effect of events that are common to all rms in the sample, e.g. global
nancial shocks or EU-level changes in regulation. Sector-year xed effects (θst) consider any circumstances
that affect single sectors in a given year at the EU-level such as changes in regulations or market competition.
This also includes all EU-wide sector-specic changes to the EU ETS and to other directives such as the Industrial
11 This is evaluated only for the observation where the amount of the subsidy is non-zero.
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Emission Directive (IED). As the treatment varies at the level of country and year, some control variables are
included in the model in order to account for time-varying factors that are country-specic. These are included
in the set Xct, which contains GDP per capita, the debit-to-GDP ratio, the average gross electricity price for the
consumption band 70k-150k MWh and the yearly amount of greenhouse gases emitted.12 Thus, the effect of
the funding on rm outcomes captured by β is to be intended net of all the above potential confounding factors.
Finally, isct represents the error.13
12 All these country-level indicators are gathered from Eurostat.
13 Standard errors are clustered at the rm level. Clustering at country or sector level yields identical results.
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5 Results
A rst naïve investigation on the performance of beneciaries and non-beneciaries over time is carried out by
observing their average trending. Figure 8 displays some descriptive evidence on the average level of measures
of turnover per employee and total assets per employee (above) and of turnover, total assets and number of
employees (below) of rms belonging to the two groups. The thick solid lines refer to the average values for the
beneciaries and the thin solid lines to the group of control rms (i.e. those not receiving funding at all). The
dashed lines represent the 95% condence intervals. The plots clearly show, rst, that on average beneciaries
are larger, as they have higher levels of turnover, total assets and employees. Moreover, beneciaries exhibit
higher levels of labour productivity and assets per employee. Second, and most importantly, the two groups
seem to behave in a similar way (or, to have a common trend), as the two curves are parallel throughout the
whole period considered in all cases.
This rst inspection suggests that the behaviour of the two groups might have not changed over time, and
especially from before to after the start of the EU ETS indirect cost compensation schemes (in 2013 for most
MS, in 2016 in Finland and in 2017 in Belgium-Wallonia). However, the raw averages might hide the effect of
some of the potential confounding factors described in the previous section, or their combination. Therefore, a
more structured approach in the form of a Difference-in-Differences model, as outlined in section 4, is required.
The remainder of this section presents the results of the estimation of the effect of receiving EU ETS indirect
cost compensation on the extensive margin (that is, whether funding is received or not) and on the intensive
margin (namely, the effect of each EUR of aid received), both for all rms in the sample and for the aluminium
sector alone.
Figure 8: Trends in performance by group, raw data
Note: Raw averages. The thick solid lines represent the average values for the beneciaries; the thin solid lines refer to the group of
non-beneciaries rms. The dashed lines represent the 95% condence intervals.
5.1 EU-ETS indirect cost compensation on the extensive margin
Table 5 shows the effect of receiving compensation for ETS indirect costs on a proxy of labour productivity,
namely turnover per employee (columns 13) and on the average value of total assets per worker (columns 46).
These are meant to account for the effect of the aid on competitiveness, thus giving insights on the existence
of potential competition distortions. Moreover, given that rms receiving compensation are substantially larger
than non-beneciaries (Figure 5), expressing the outcomes in relative terms on the basis of the rms' number
of employees increases the comparability across the two groups.
A rst simple estimation of the effect of receiving compensation on turnover per employee, presented in
column 1, includes only basic controls: rm and year xed effects. These account for all differences across
rms that do not vary over time and for common shocks that occur across all rms in a given time period. The
estimated coefcient is not statistically different from zero. This estimate, however, does not include those
unobserved factors which are specic for each sector in a certain year (i.e. NACEyear xed effects) nor country
characteristics that may vary over time. As mentioned in section 4, including these elements in the model is
crucial to control for these potential confounders. They are added to the model in column 2 and 3, respectively.
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As a result, the coefcient changes sign but is, again, imprecisely estimated and cannot be distinguished from
zero. Column 3 reports the full specication that is presented in equation 1. Columns 4 to 6 of Table 5 reproduce
the same estimates when total assets per employee is considered and yield identical ndings.
This rst set of results suggests that the EU ETS indirect cost compensation on average did not have an
impact on per worker measures, thus pointing to the absence of market distortions due to the compensation.
Considering measures of protability in absolute terms would capture changes in the production levels
that rms overtake in the short run (turnover and employment) and in the medium run (total assets), hence
approximating for the risk of carbon leakage, together with rm size (number of employees).
Table 6 shows the estimated effect of the compensation on turnover (columns 13), total assets (columns
46) and employment (columns 79). These measures represent the economic protability and the size of the
rm in absolute terms. As in the previous case, the preferred specications are the ones that include all xed
effects and control variables (namely, columns 3, 6 and 9). The estimated coefcients are always negative and
statistically signicant and suggest that receiving compensation yields lower levels of turnover by 5.6%, of total
assets by 6.3% and reduces employment by 4.4.%. These ndings are in line with existing studies (Cox et al.,
2014; Marin and Vona, 2017) mainly focusing on the substitution effect of energy to labour triggered by those
policies that foster the transition to renewable energy.
These results might appear as counter-intuitive, as they suggests that rms receiving compensation experi-
ence a worse performance compared to rms in the control group who do not receive funding. According to the
analysis, this occurs in particular in terms of absolute values of turnover, total assets and employment levels.
There exists different potential reasons behind these estimated effects.
A partial explanation may come from the differences in size of treated and control rms highlighted in
Figure 5. Considering normalised outcomes as in Table 5 attenuates potential systematic differences in market
structure between the two groups.
In addition, it is clear there exist some elements that enter the production function of rms which are not
observed in their balance sheet data, such as the cost of the inputs. In the examined case, which focuses on
rms that operate in energy-intensive sectors, the cost of energy is a non-negligible part of production costs.
It is widely accepted in the literature that climate policies in support of renewable energies imply an increase
of the electricity cost and this, in turn, induces rms to optimize their production function by using a different
combination of inputs. Thus, as energy becomes more expensive it is substituted to labour (Cox et al., 2014;
Marin and Vona, 2017). This interrelation between electricity prices and labour is deeply investigated in Cox
et al. (2014) who focus on German manufacturing. In this study, as in the evaluation illustrated here, more
accurate estimates would benet of rm level data on electricity prices, which is still lacking.
Yet, in principle, such mechanisms alone would only affect the number of employees and it would not allow
for the compensation of indirect costs to have a negative impact on the performance of aided businesses in
comparison to those that do not receive any funding, unless the cost of energy for beneciaries, net of the
subsidy, was higher than that for rms in the comparison group. Unfortunately, the data at hand does not allow
Table 5: Effect of receiving aid on turnover per employee and total assets per employee, all sectors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable Turnover Turnover Turnover Total assets Total assets Total assets
per employee per employee per employee per employee per employee per employee
Aid 0.020 -0.013 -0.012 0.004 -0.008 -0.020
(0.020) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.029) (0.030)
Observations 23,277 23,277 23,277 23,277 23,277 23,277
R-squared 0.922 0.924 0.924 0.917 0.918 0.919
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
NACE-Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-specic controls Yes Yes
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Standard errors in parentheses. `Aid' is equal to one if the rm is a beneciary of compensation and equal to zero
otherwise. The dependent variable is expressed in logarithm. Country-specic controls include GDP per capita, debit-to-GDP ratio, gross electricity price for
the consumption band 70k-150k MWh and emissions of greenhouse gases (in CO2 equivalent).
Table 6: Effect of receiving aid on turnover, total assets and employment, all sectors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Dependent variable Turnover Turnover Turnover Total assets Total assets Total assets Employees Employees Employees
Aid -0.063*** -0.044* -0.056** -0.079*** -0.039 -0.063** -0.083*** -0.031 -0.044**
(0.023) (0.026) (0.025) (0.024) (0.026) (0.027) (0.017) (0.020) (0.020)
Observations 23,277 23,277 23,277 23,277 23,277 23,277 23,277 23,277 23,277
R-squared 0.975 0.975 0.975 0.980 0.981 0.981 0.974 0.974 0.974
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
NACE-Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-specic controls Yes Yes Yes
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Standard errors in parentheses. `Aid' is equal to one if the rm is a beneciary of compensation and equal to zero otherwise. The dependent variable is
expressed in logarithm. Country-specic controls include GDP per capita, debit-to-GDP ratio, gross electricity price for the consumption band 70k-150k MWh and emissions of greenhouse gases
(in CO2 equivalent).
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Table 7: Effect of receiving aid on turnover per employee and total assets per employee, aluminium sector
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable Turnover Turnover Turnover Total assets
per employee per employee per employee per employee
Aid 0.090 0.108* 0.136 0.142
(0.058) (0.065) (0.104) (0.111)
Observations 1,249 1,249 1,249 1,249
R-squared 0.860 0.860 0.864 0.866
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-specic controls Yes Yes
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Standard errors in parentheses. `Aid' is equal to one if the rm is a beneciary of
compensation and equal to zero otherwise. The dependent variable is expressed in logarithm. Country-specic controls
include GDP per capita, debit-to-GDP ratio, gross electricity price for the consumption band 70k-150k MWh and emissions
of greenhouse gases (in CO2 equivalent).
Table 8: Effect of receiving aid on turnover, total assets and employment, aluminium sector
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable Turnover Turnover Total assets Total assets Employees Employees
Aid -0.024 -0.055 0.021 -0.020 -0.114 -0.162**
(0.097) (0.097) (0.091) (0.094) (0.077) (0.075)
Observations 1,249 1,249 1,249 1,249 1,249 1,249
R-squared 0.967 0.968 0.980 0.980 0.960 0.961
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-specic controls Yes Yes Yes
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Standard errors in parentheses. `Aid' is equal to one if the rm is a beneciary of compensation and equal to zero
otherwise. The dependent variable is expressed in logarithm. Country-specic controls include GDP per capita, debit-to-GDP ratio, gross electricity price for
the consumption band 70k-150k MWh and emissions of greenhouse gases (in CO2 equivalent).
to causally test this hypothesis, as input costs (and especially energy costs) at the rm level are not observable.
A way to understand whether differentials in energy costs could represent a decisive determinant of this
result is to look at the trends of energy prices in countries that compensate indirect costs and countries that do
not. Figure A.3 depicts the average gross energy prices for non-household consumers in the consumption bands
20k70k MWh and 70k-150k MWh (top) and the average share of energy produced from renewable sources
(bottom), split by group, i.e. compensating versus non compensating countries.14
The trends in the average energy prices suggest that energy costs were relatively similar in the period up
until 2013 but substantially diverge in the following years. Specically, in MS belonging to the control group
the average prices fell steeply, while in the countries that provide compensation for indirect costs they start
declining only after a few years. Moreover, the plot at the bottom of Figure A.3 shows that non-aided countries
are characterised by a higher share of energy production coming from renewable sources throughout the whole
period considered.15 This is coherent with energy having a lower price on average in countries that belong to the
control group, and the more so given that in these areas rms could access extra benets reserved to the use of
renewable sources. This evidence, albeit suggestive, would be consistent with the co-existence of a premium in
energy costs for rms receiving compensation compared to non-funded businesses, which could possibly offset
the effects of the compensation.16
Tables 7 and 8 show the estimates of the previous models considering the aluminium sector alone.17 In
terms of labour productivity and assets per employee the coefcient is positive in all the specications, but,
again, not statistically signicant.18 When looking at the variables in absolute terms, the effect is always
negative, albeit precisely estimated only when employment is taken as outcome. In the aluminium sector, rms
receiving compensation experience a reduction in the number of employees of about 16% (column 6, Table 8).
5.1.1 Robustness checks
The Difference-in-Differences model relies upon the validity of some strong identifying hypotheses. Among
these, the validation of the so-called common trend assumption is crucial. The existence of a common trend
between treated rms and controls in the period before the implementation of the policy means that the two
groups are comparable in terms of performance they had before receiving the aid. If this condition is veried, it
14 In the sample, the median amount of energy consumed by rms over the years 2005 to 2017, as reported in the beneciaries records,
is typically around 65k MWh.
15 Here, no data is available for Finland and Hungary.
16 The data on energy prices presented in Figure A.3 do not account for different taxation and deduction rates applied by the single MS
to various price subcomponents. Thus, this reasoning might be less powerful if countries in the treated group applied systematically lower
taxation and/or higher deduction rates in the post-2013 period with respect to MS in the control group. Furthermore, rms' energy costs
might derive from bilateral negotiations with power generators which are not identied in balance sheet data.
17 Since the focus is on a single sector, the NACE-year xed effects are dropped from the model due to their collinearity with the year
xed effects.
18 Except the coefcient in column 2, although its signicance is weak.
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is meaningful to apply the double difference to estimate the impact of the subsidy in the post-implementation
period.
In order to assess its validity and to test whether there has been any anticipation of the intervention before
its formal entry into force, an event study in the spirit of Autor (2003) is carried out, by considering three years
before the implementation and ve years after. The choice is driven by the fact that the bulk of the treated
rms in the sample started receiving compensation in 2013. For this group of rms, the selected range allows
for t-3 being the year 2009 and t+5 being the year 2017, which are the rst and the last year observed in the
data. However, the treatment does not start in the same year for all rms: compensation is available since
2016 in Finland and since 2017 in Belgium-Wallonia. Hence, the event study analysis is centered around the
year of implementation, in order to make rms operating in different countries comparable on the basis of how
long they have been exposed to the treatment (i.e. the compensation).
The event study analysis is plotted in Figure 9 for all ve outcomes considered. Here, all sectors are included
in the sample. The horizontal axis counts the years to the implementation and the vertical dashed line separates
the pre-implementation period from the years when rms are exposed to the compensation. In all cases, the
estimated yearly coefcients in the pre-implementation period are never statistically different from zero, as
condence interval crosses the zero line in all cases. This proves the absence of any anticipatory effect and that
the behaviour of rms before the approval of the ETS indirect cost compensation was following a similar trend
with respect to rms operating in countries without aid.19
The event study analysis also provides some insights on the dynamics of the policy effects, showing how the
impact changes over time. When considering the years after the implementation, the plots reect the results
presented in Tables 5 and 6 are conrmed. In fact, the evidence points to a non statistically signicant impact
of the indirect cost compensation on per worker outcomes both in the short (at t+1) and in the longer run (t+2
to t+ 5). Notwithstanding, a negative effect is found on turnover, total assets and employment, especially four
and ve years after the compensation being in place.
The plots in Figure 10 show the event study analysis for the ve outcomes with a focus on the aluminium
sector. Coefcients are never statistically signicant, but it is worth highlighting that the point estimates on
labour productivity are slightly positive, and possibly determined by a reduction in employment (the denominator
of the ratio) which is not coupled with variations in terms of turnover (the numerator).
As a further robustness test, all estimates are re-run excluding each country or sector, one at a time, to
ensure that the results discussed above are not driven by a single group of observations. These are presented
in Figures A.1 and A.2. The graphs plot the estimated coefcients and their respective condence intervals
obtained by repeating the fully-specied model for all outcomes over a sample which excludes either countries
(Figure A.1) or sectors (Figure A.2) one by one. The at patterns conrm that results are not markedly driven by
Figure 9: Event studies: effect of receiving aid on firm performance, all sectors
Note: The vertical dashed line identies the year of implementation (2012, 2015 or 2016, depending on the country considered). Black dots are the points
estimates of the effect of the aid in each year; the vertical lines represent the respective 90% condence intervals. Regressions include xed effects and
controls as from Equation 1.
19 In other words, given that the coefcients associated to the pre-intervention time periods -3, -2 and -1 are never distinguishable from
zero, the conditional outcome trends between rms in the treatment and the control groups are the same.
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Figure 10: Event studies: effect of receiving aid on firm performance, aluminium sector
Note: The vertical dashed line identies the year of implementation (2012, 2015 or 2016, depending on the country considered). Black dots are the points
estimates of the effect of the aid in each year; the vertical lines represent the respective 90% condence intervals. Regressions include rm, group and year
xed effects.
a single country or sector, as their exclusion does not considerably affect the overall estimates. This evidence is
reassuring, also in view of the country differences in relative size and the sectoral heterogeneity across treated
and control rms revealed by the descriptive statistics in Figure 3.
5.1.2 Heterogeneous effects
Being part of a large group of companies could allow rms exploiting some comparative advantages with respect
to other rms facing market challenges alone. In the case of the EU ETS this could translate in economies of
scale on productivity and electricity prices which, in turn, would affect rms' performance. Hence, it is worth
investigating whether the intervention has had an heterogeneous effect on those companies which are part of a
group or an international group. To this end, two additional variables are dened: `Firm in group' takes value one
if the rm belongs to a group counting at least two rms and is equal to zero otherwise; `Firm in international
group' which is equal to one if the rm belongs to a group operating in at least two different countries and zero
otherwise. In the main sample, around 8% of businesses belongs to a group and 5% to an international group
of rms. For the aluminium sector these gures are 6% and 4%, respectively.
The interpretation of the results is slightly different compared to those discussed above and less straight-
forward. Here, the effect is still given by the derivative of the equation with respect to the treatment, although
this is now computed as the linear combination of the terms `Aid' and `Aid * Firm in (international) group'. For
the sake of an easier reading of the results, the linear combination and its respective p-value are reported in
Table 9, which refers to the whole sample, and in Table 10, which contains estimates run on the sub-sample of
rms operating in the aluminium sector only.
The estimates presented in both Tables 9 and 10 show that, in general, there is no heterogeneous effect of
the ETS compensation for indirect costs for businesses belonging to a group of at least two rms (columns 15),
as the p-values associated to the linear combination always exceed the conventional 5% level of signicance.
Furthermore, in the sample that includes all the sectors, accounting for some heterogeneous characteristics
in terms of rms' organisational structure, still conrms the negative differential effect on turnover, total assets
and employees of rms receiving compensation with respect to controls (`Aid' in columns 35 and columns
810, Table 9). Interestingly, it appears that rms belonging to a group and receiving compensation experience
an increase in the value of total assets by around 13-14% compared to rms that are not aided or are not part
of a group. This applies regardless of how groups are dened (columns 4 and 9, Table 9). However, the linear
combination of these effects is never statistically different from zero, meaning that there is no difference in
performance between aided rms that belong to a group and stand-alone businesses that receive compensation.
Similar results are obtained on the aluminium sector, with the exception of a slightly signicant increase in
labour productivity for aided rms in international groups in comparison to rms that are funded but do not
belong to international groups.
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Table 9: Effect of receiving aid on firms belonging to groups, all sectors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Dependent variable Turnover Total assets Turnover Total assets Employees Turnover Total assets Turnover Total assets Employees
per employee per employee per employee per employee
Aid -0.023 -0.034 -0.074*** -0.085*** -0.051*** -0.023 -0.034 -0.075*** -0.086*** -0.052***
(0.021) (0.028) (0.024) (0.026) (0.019) (0.021) (0.028) (0.024) (0.026) (0.019)
Firm in group 0.061 0.045 0.004 -0.012 -0.057*
(0.045) (0.042) (0.041) (0.035) (0.034)
Aid * Firm in group 0.064 0.082 0.109 0.127* 0.045
(0.081) (0.085) (0.083) (0.076) (0.067)
Firm in int'l group 0.041 0.079 -0.035 0.003 -0.076
(0.056) (0.063) (0.076) (0.052) (0.058)
Aid * Firm in int'l group 0.071 0.088 0.120 0.138* 0.050
(0.085) (0.087) (0.086) (0.079) (0.069)
Linear combination 0.041 0.048 0.035 0.042 -0.006 0.047 0.054 0.045 0.052 -0.002
p-value 0.612 0.568 0.671 0.581 0.921 0.580 0.532 0.598 0.503 0.974
Observations 23,277 23,277 23,277 23,277 23,277 23,277 23,277 23,277 23,277 23,277
R-squared 0.924 0.919 0.975 0.981 0.974 0.924 0.919 0.975 0.981 0.974
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
NACE-Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-specic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. All sectors. `Aid' is equal to one if the rm is a beneciary of compensation and equal to zero otherwise. `Firm in group' is equal to one if the rm belongs to a group counting at
least two rms and is equal to zero otherwise. `Firm in int'l group' is equal to one if the rm belongs to a group operating in at least two countries and is equal to zero otherwise. `Linear combination' is the sum of the
coefcients associated to `Firm in group' and `Aid * Firm in group' (columns 15) and to `Firm in int'l group' and `Aid * Firm in int'l group' (columns 610). `p-value' is the corresponding p-value. Country-specic controls
include GDP per capita, debit-to-GDP ratio, gross electricity price for the consumption band 70k-150k MWh and emissions of greenhouse gases (in CO2 equivalent).
Table 10: Effect of receiving aid on firms belonging to groups, aluminium sector
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Dependent variable Turnover Total assets Turnover Total assets Employees Turnover Total assets Turnover Total assets Employees
per employee per employee per employee per employee
Aid 0.122 0.158 -0.056 -0.019 -0.177** 0.117 0.145 -0.057 -0.030 -0.175**
(0.077) (0.129) (0.114) (0.110) (0.087) (0.077) (0.121) (0.111) (0.102) (0.083)
Firm in group 0.118 -0.118 -0.016 -0.251** -0.134***
(0.208) (0.125) (0.201) (0.124) (0.035)
Aid * Firm in group -0.077 -0.088 0.006 -0.005 0.083
(0.101) (0.135) (0.161) (0.121) (0.102)
Firm in int'l group 0.967*** 0.314*** 0.818*** 0.165*** -0.149**
(0.041) (0.068) (0.080) (0.056) (0.067)
Aid * Firm in int'l group 0.015 0.006 0.125 0.115 0.109
(0.094) (0.142) (0.211) (0.100) (0.147)
Linear combination 0.045 0.070 -0.050 -0.024 -0.094 0.133 0.151 0.067 0.085 -0.066
p-value 0.517 0.401 0.683 0.771 0.225 0.050 0.115 0.709 0.116 0.605
Observations 1,249 1,249 1,249 1,249 1,249 1,249 1,249 1,249 1,249 1,249
R-squared 0.860 0.866 0.968 0.981 0.961 0.861 0.866 0.969 0.980 0.961
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-specic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Aluminium sector only. `Aid' is equal to one if the rm is a beneciary of compensation and equal to zero otherwise. `Firm in group' is equal to one if the rm belongs to a group
counting at least two rms and is equal to zero otherwise. `Firm in int'l group' is equal to one if the rm belongs to a group operating in at least two countries and is equal to zero otherwise. `Linear combination'
is the sum of the coefcients associated to `Firm in group' and `Aid * Firm in group' (columns 15) and to `Firm in int'l group' and `Aid * Firm in int'l group' (columns 610). `p-value' is the corresponding p-value.
Country-specic controls include GDP per capita, debit-to-GDP ratio, gross electricity price for the consumption band 70k-150k MWh and emissions of greenhouse gases (in CO2 equivalent).
5.2 EU-ETS indirect cost compensation on the intensive margin
The previous ndings presented the effect of the ETS indirect compensation intended as a binary treatment.
However, compensation is funded by each MS with different intensities, as shown in Figure 4. This suggests
analysing the impact of the aid on the performance of the treated rms receiving a subsidy, in order to account
for the intensity of the transfer. In this section, the sample is reduced to rms operating in aided countries only
and for which information on the subsidy is available. This implies that this part of the analysis contemplates
a more homogeneous sample and is exempt from the potential systematic differences across countries in the
treated and control groups discussed in the previous section.
Results on the intensive margins are presented both for the whole sample (Table 11) and for the aluminium
sector alone (Table 12).
When considering all funded businesses operating in any of the eligible sectors, results highlight the absence
of any signicant impact on per worker productivity (Table 11, columns 1 and 2), while turnover, total assets and
the number of employees seem to be higher the larger the amount of aid received by rms. This would suggest
that among the aided countries only, for each 1% increase in the amount of the subsidy received (i.e. around
1,000 EUR), rms expand their turnover and their assets value by 0.01%, and their workforce by 0.07%.
Thus, it would appear that within the group of rms that are subsidised, an increase in the amount granted
is associated to a better performance, which would reduce the risk of carbon leakage.
The results replicated for the aluminium sector alone yields similar conclusions (Table 12). A positive and
marginally signicant effect is found on employment, while turnover increases by about 0.23% for every 1%
rise in the amount of subsidy. In other words, the existence of a positive effect suggests that rms receiving a
higher subsidy tend to experience a better performance in terms of turnover and job retention in comparison to
rms receiving grants of lower amounts.
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Table 11: Effect of receiving aid on turnover per employee and total assets per employee, intensive margin, all sectors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable Turnover Total assets Turnover Total assets Employees
per employee per employee
Subsidy 0.025 0.026 0.098** 0.098** 0.073**
(0.048) (0.049) (0.047) (0.048) (0.036)
Observations 617 617 617 617 617
R-squared 0.959 0.957 0.989 0.985 0.990
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
NACE-Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-specic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Standard errors in parentheses. Sample of beneciaries of indirect cost compensation only.
`Subsidy' is the logarithm of the amount received by beneciaries. Country-specic controls include GDP per capita, debit-to-GDP ratio,
gross electricity price for the consumption band 70k-150k MWh and emissions of greenhouse gases (in CO2 equivalent).
Table 12: Effect of receiving aid on employment, intensive margin, aluminium sector
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable Turnover Total assets Turnover Total assets Employees
per employee per employee
ln(subsidy) 0.110 0.168 0.225** 0.283 0.116*
(0.069) (0.179) (0.090) (0.187) (0.059)
Observations 65 65 65 65 65
R-squared 0.944 0.814 0.991 0.960 0.995
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-specic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Standard errors in parentheses. Sample of beneciaries of indirect cost compensation only.
`Subsidy' is the logarithm of the amount received by beneciaries. Country-specic controls include GDP per capita, debit-to-GDP ratio,
gross electricity price for the consumption band 70k-150k MWh and emissions of greenhouse gases (in CO2 equivalent).
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6 Caveats and suggestions to increase the quality of future evaluations
The evaluation contained in this report is the rst analysis that employs rm-level data deriving from the records
on beneciaries of indirect cost compensation that MS are obliged to transmit to DG COMP. As such, it offers the
opportunity to reect on the potential for improvement in relation to reporting obligation procedures and data
collection. This appears especially relevant given the foreseen revision of the Guidelines on certain State Aid
measures in the context of the GHG allowance trading system post-2020.
The harmonisation of the records carried out for the analysis herein presented proved to be demanding in
terms of time and effort. In what follows, some suggestions are provided on a possible revision of the reporting
requirements and, in particular, on the format in which the information is transmitted to the Commission by MS.
The aim is to envisage a standardised reporting practice that will ease the processing of the records in view
of future evaluations exercises. At the same time, the proposed changes would be at very low cost for the
reporting authorities, as they would not constitute an additional burden for them, given that all the information
mentioned below is already in their possession.
First, it would be desirable that reporting authorities are provided with a standardised template designed
by the Commission, which would ease the automatised management of the information. To date, the records
on beneciaries provided to the Commission greatly differ in format from one MS to another, and sometimes
the same MS uses different templates over time. For this reason, most of the information used in the analysis
required a large amount of harmonisation to be done by hand.
Thus, it is suggested that:
• all records are provided in .xls or .csv format;
• each row refers to a single plant/installation/activity;
• any information is provided in wide format (all in the same row);
• all the relevant information is recorded in the same worksheet (one per year, per MS).
Second, the inclusion of the following information in all records would sensibly increase data quality and the
chances to successfully link the records on the beneciaries to other sources such as the Orbis database (as in
the analysis presented in this report) and the e-PRTR database:
• the ofcial names of the rm and of the plant/installation;
• the VAT number;
• the plant/installation (facility) ID as reported in the e-PRTR database;
• the location (city and country) of the plant;
• the 4-digit NACE code of the activity carried out within the plant/installation;
• all elements necessary to compute the formula as reported in the Guidelines;
• the amount of the aid computed for the given plant/installation/activity;
• any adjustment to the aid amount;
• the nal amount received by the rm for the given plant/installation/activity;
• any other transfer received by rm for the given plant/installation/activity under other national schemes.
Most of the above information is already present in the records transmitted by the majority of MS to the
Commission. However, it is the case that some of the entries are transmitted only in part, or are not reported at
all, despite the fact that they are in the possession of the corresponding national managing authority.
When harmonising records provided by different MS, if any of the entries is not available even for one country
or for a single year, then the entry cannot be used in the analysis. As outlined in the section 3.1 and summarised
in Table 2, this issue markedly limited the possibility to exploit the available data in the evaluation presented in
this report. For instance, it was not possible to account for the consumption of electricity reported in the records
on the beneciaries, nor for the recipiency of other transfers related to the emissions of GHG, because some
MS did not transmit this piece of information. Taking these factors into consideration in the analysis, however,
would have been important in order to better identify the effect of interest (i.e. the impact of EU ETS indirect
cost compensation on rm outcomes). Moreover, a ner denition of the entities receiving the aid, for instance
via the provision of records at the plant level with information on their name and location (or, better, the facility
ID reported in the e-PRTR), would have enabled linking the records on the beneciaries to relevant databases
such as the e-PRTR. This would have allowed studying also whether the indirect cost compensation brought
about a conversion of the technologies and a reduction in emissions by the funded plants.
Third, in the best-case scenario, the database would also include records on rms receiving aid under the de
minimis rule. As outlined in section 3.3, the absence of such information constituted a major challenge when
selecting a proper comparison group and led to the decision to retain only larger rms in the sample. While the
selection of the sample in the analysis was made so as to minimise arbitrariness, if complete information were
present the sample would have been chosen following an entirely objective procedure.
22
7 Conclusion
This evaluation exercise investigates the impact of the EU ETS compensation for indirect costs on rm outcomes.
The analysis exploits the advantage of a unique panel dataset at rm level, containing detailed information
on the beneciaries of the ETS indirect cost compensation gathered by DG COMP and balance sheet nancial
variables of rms extracted from the Orbis database.
This is the rst study analysing the impact of the ETS indirect cost compensation at rm level with an EU-wide
coverage. Moreover, in comparison to the prior literature, it is the rst attempt to carry out the evaluation of this
policy in a quasi-experimental framework and to estimate the causal impact of the indirect cost compensation.
Findings are in line with the existing literature analysing single country interventions (mainly on tax exemp-
tions and tax refunds). The results presented here suggest that the aid has not had a signicant effect on
average relative competitiveness, measured in terms of turnover per worker and the value of total assets per
employees. However, there is evidence of beneciaries performing worse than rms operating in non-funded
countries when turnover, value of total assets and number of employees are considered as outcomes. This
applies to the sample of all rms operating in the sectors eligible to compensation and, to a lesser extent, to
businesses active in the aluminium sector alone.
These results point to a reduction in performance of aided rms, which might then be subject to a higher risk
of carbon leakage. This could be due to systematic differences across countries that provide funding and those
that do not, which might originate, for instance, from different patterns in the evolution of electricity prices.
When focusing only on the beneciaries for which the value of the subsidy is available, a positive impact
of the compensation is identied. Specically, the estimated coefcients imply that rms receiving a higher
subsidy experience a positive and signicant impact on the measures of turnover, total assets and employment
considered, in comparison to businesses that receive lower aid amounts.
These results offer interesting insights in terms of how rms adapt production decisions to transfers doses
and to what extent heterogeneous treatment intensities might affect rms' economic performance and, in turn,
market competition and leakage.
Another question which is left unanswered, but that would be relevant to the objectives of the EU ETS as a
whole, refers to the impact this policy has had on rms' behaviour in terms of electricity consumption, for which
data is not available, as some rms might have decided to switch to energy generated from more sustainable
sources.
As a nal remark, the exercise suggests that high-quality data collection should represent a crucial aspect
of the policy cycle, so as to allow a more accurate and solid evaluation of the policy impact.
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8 Appendix
Table A.1: Number of firms dropped in the balancing procedure
Country Firms Country Firms
BE 8 CZ 208
DE 102 HU 169
ES 13 IT 809
FI 1 PL 460
NL 11 PT 38
UK 9 SE 50
Total 144 Total 1,734
Table A.2: List of aided sectors
NACE Rev. 2 code Description
7.1 Mining of iron ores
8.91 Mining of chemical and fertiliser minerals
10.62 Manufacture of starches and starch products
10.81 Manufacture of sugar
10.91 Manufacture of prepared feeds for farm animals
13.1 Preparation and spinning of textile bres
13.2 Weaving of textiles
13.93 Manufacture of carpets and rugs
14.11 Manufacture of leather clothes
17.11 Manufacture of pulp
17.12 Manufacture of paper and paperboard
17.22 Manufacture of household and sanitary goods and of toilet requisites
18.14 Binding and related services
19.1 Manufacture of coke oven products
19.2 Manufacture of rened petroleum products
20.11 Manufacture of industrial gases
20.12 Manufacture of dyes and pigments
20.13 Manufacture of other inorganic basic chemicals
20.14 Manufacture of other organic basic chemicals
20.15 Manufacture of fertilisers and nitrogen compounds
20.16 Manufacture of plastics in primary forms
20.2 Manufacture of pesticides and other agrochemical products
20.3 Manufacture of paints, varnishes and similar coatings, printing ink and mastics
20.59 Manufacture of other chemical products n.e.c.
20.6 Manufacture of man-made bres
22.22 Manufacture of plastic packing goods
24.1 Manufacture of basic iron and steel and of ferro-alloys
24.2 Manufacture of tubes, pipes, hollow proles and related ttings, of steel
24.42 Aluminium production
24.43 Lead, zinc and tin production
24.44 Copper production
24.45 Other non-ferrous metal production
24.51 Casting of iron
28.94 Manufacture of machinery for textile, apparel and leather production
46.12 Agents involved in the sale of fuels, ores, metals and industrial chemicals
46.75 Wholesale of chemical products
Note: The list of aided sectors is based on the Annex II, of (European Commission, 2012) and on the list
of NACE codes derived from the beneciaries records provided by MS.
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Figure A.1: Effect of receiving aid on firm performance, excluding countries one by one
Note: The horizontal axis reports the country excluded from the estimation. Coefcients (black dots) estimated as from Equation 1. Dashed
lines represent 95% condence intervals.
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Figure A.2: Effect of receiving aid on firm performance, excluding sectors one by one
Note: The horizontal axis reports the sector excluded from the estimation. Coefcients (black dots) estimated as from Equation 1. Dashed
lines represent 95% condence intervals.
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Figure A.3: Average gross energy prices for non-household consumers and share of renewables in electricity production
Note: Raw averages. The thick solid lines represent the average values for the aided countries; the thin solid lines refer to the countries that
do not apply compensation Sources: Eurostat (gross electricity prices) and Enerdata (share of renewables).
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